The desire satisfaction theory suggests that the actual level of satisfaction of one’s desire in their whole life is a person’s well-being. The principle teaches us that provided you get everything you desire, your life is going fine for you. Something is perfect for you when your desires are satisfied, In general, the happier your life is, the often you obtain what you desire, and if you don’t get what you desire, life becomes frustrating. When we support this welfare principle and think about others’ needs, then we’d attempt to satisfy the desires of other people, no matter what it is. The desire satisfaction theory is relational in such a sense that preferences are similarly important to all, and there is no desire that is more important than any other desire. That is how the theory of desire dismisses other kinds of objective hypotheses on well-being. Objective ideas and what leads to a happy life are set outside your view of what counts and desires. This takes into consideration, the sovereignty of the people. Individuals must possess the freedom of desire and control of their lives to be effective at desire satisfaction. There are, of course, cases where individuals desire inappropriate kinds of stuff or kinds of stuff they wouldn’t necessarily desire.
These desires for problems are triggered by the scarcity of knowledge regarding their desire, conceptual flaws in deciding their desire, misconceptions, and desiring inherently unlikely kinds of stuff. Even if an individual desired the best stuff for the appropriate purposes, the argument persists that the desires are pointless; just like the Grass Counter Objection case.
With this argument, Cara seems a logical and very knowledgeable person willing to do a great deal throughout her life. Alternatively, Cara opts for counting grass blades. This objection asks if the desire satisfaction theory is incorrect to suggest that everybody desires equality since a counting grass-like existence can’t be compared with a life of pleasure and love. It also asks if having your desires fosters your well-being. In Cara’s situation, she desires to count grass blades, despite having more ability to go on with her existence and get more satisfaction if she didn’t just want to count grass blades. Logic tells many people that indeed Cara is spending her life loosely. Cara’s desire to be counting blades of grass may appear meaningless and does not improve her life. Even though Cara takes great delight in counting blades of grass, it can’t be associated with the greater pleasures of friendship and love. Therefore, by not seeking such greater sources of gratification, which would encourage further satisfaction, Caras’ resolution to count blades of grass is erroneous, so satisfying her desires can’t be the socially appropriate move for her welfare. This argument may further suggest that not every desire is equivalent and some may be futile, irrespective of whether they are reasonable and knowledgeable and do no damage to the desiring individual. This argument may appear to show that the desire for fulfilment about welfare is false; also the finest life isn’t one that one desires. However, I would accept the objectors’ view that affection and intimacy are more important than grass counting, but I don’t think that desiring to count grass blades is dreadful or meaningless to Caras’ welfare. Even I think it’s the right move.
A desire may appear to us as flawed, not because for the erroneous reasons we desire it, but rather because that desire might seem meaningless. A day overseen counting grass may seem peaceful, but it may seem ridiculous to have spent a whole life counting grass. But the desire satisfaction theory will accept lives lived doing many meaningless things, provided the person remains willing to do those meaningless things. On this condition, we believe Cara is well known and a rational person who doesn’t suffer from any sort of grass counting neurosis and her irresistible desire for counting grass gives her more joy than suffering, after that, we can reasonably conclude that grass counting enhances Caras’ well-being. The theory of desire doesn’t place inherent value on enjoyment, and they are equal to everybody. Consequently, Caras’ willingness to count blades of grass, often at the expense of not continuing to pursue greater degrees of enjoyment, would make her happier, and believing otherwise will be bigotry on the part of the objectors. To believe that grass counting is less deserving than a friendship and love life is a distortion of the objection. And if we can empirically show that friendships and affection are more important than grass counting, if Cara won’t desire something like that it won’t improve her welfare. That’s because, if she doesn’t desire them, she can’t appreciate the importance of those so-called highly valued desires. For an individual to gain a fine living from the desires, the person must truly have a desire.
Imagine a university student that desires to be an artist, including at the expense of realizing that if she chooses to pursue professions like an engineer or a doctor, her future would be financially stable. Now picture if ultimately her parents compelled her to be a physician. She becomes one, saves several lives and becomes highly regarded. Yet since she never intended to be a physician, but was coerced by her parents’ responsibility and guilt, she couldn’t cherish all the benefits she received as a physician. There will likely be a powerful lingering desire to pursue an artistic profession.
The beauty of a desire is subject to the views of people, such that one person’s most meaningless desire may be another’s most thrilling desire. Desire theoreticians evade such issues about the significance of enjoyment because they know that there are several things in a good life, such that the desires of everyone are special to them. Therefore, if we undermine her well-being, we may damage Cara by specifically failing to let her fulfil her heart’s desire, given the lack of success in the operation. So my conclusion is that desires might be deemed meaningless if there are an objective means of evaluating the activity’s efficiency, but there are no unnecessary desires on the desire-satisfaction-based welfare scale at all.